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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Japan concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation,1 (FCN Treaty) to regulate the day-ta-day relationship between private 
parties within the two countries.2 In general, the FCN Treaty permits citizens and 
companies of either country to conduct business within the other country just as that 
country's own citizens and companies could.3 Companies of either party are per-
mitted to engage in a wide variety of enterprises on a reciprocal basis and to organize 
those enterprises as either branches or subsidiaries.4 The FCN Treaty thus grants 
Japanese companies broad rights when operating within the United States. 
1. Apr. 2, 1953, United States-jiipan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T .I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as japanese 
FCN Treatyj. 
2. Walker, Modern Treaties of FriendshiP, Commerce and Navigatilm, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, 805 (1958). 
The United States has concluded Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaties of a similar 
type with the following countries: Kingdom of Belgium, Feb. 1, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 
5432; China, 63 Stat. (2) 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871; Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 
4797; Ethiopia, Sept. 7,1951,4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; France, Nov. 25,1959,11 U.S.T. 2398, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; 
Greece, Aug. 3,1951,5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Iran, Aug. 15, 1955,8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 
3853; Ireland, jan. 21, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; israel, Aug. 23, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 550, 
T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Italy, Feb. 2, 1948,63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Republic of Korea, Mar. 13, 
1956,8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Luxembourg, Feb. 23,1962,14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; 
Muscat and Oman, Dec. 20, 1958, 11 U.S.T. 1835, T.l.A.S. No. 4530; Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956,8 
U.S.T. 2043, T.l.A.S. No. 3942; Nicaragua, jan. 21, 1956,9 U.S.T. 449, T.l.A.S. No. 4024; Pakistan, 
Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Republic of Viet Nam, Apr. 3, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1703, 
T.l.A.S. No. 4890; Kingdom of Thailand, May 29, 1966, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.l.A.S. No. 6540. 
The volume of U.S. trade with japan has greatly increased in recent years. Total foreign direct 
investment in the United States has increased at an annual percentage rate of 27% over the last four 
years and reached a high in 1981 of $89.7 billion. Of this amount, japanese investment totaled almost 
$6.9 billion, while the annual increase in such investments has accrued at a rate of 41%. Foreign 
Investment in the U.S. is Crowing Sharply with Some Funding Shifts, 29 Bus. INT'L 305, 309 (1982). 
3. Walker, Provisilms on Companies in United States Treaties, 50 AM J. INT'L L. 373, 385 (1956). 
4. japanese FCN Treaty,supra note 1, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. Article VII 
provides in part that 
Id. 
[njationals and companies of either Party ... [are permittedj to engag[ej in all types of 
commercial, industrial, financial and other business activities within the territories of the other 
Party ... to establish and maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establish-
ments ... to organize companies under the general company laws of such other Party, and to 
acquire majority interests in companies of such other Party; and to control and manage 
enterprises which they have established or acquired. 
67 
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This treaty also affords Japanese companies great latitude when making hiring 
decisions.5 Article VIII( 1) of the FCN Treaty provides that "companies of either 
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accoun-
tants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other 
specialists of their choice ."6 Based solely on this provision, companies of Japan operat-
ing within the United States might be permitted to hire only Japanese persons to fill 
such positions; 7 however, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 restricts the 
freedom of an employer to hire whomever he chooses.9 Title VII provides that "[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire 
... any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin."lo Thus, employers within the scope of the Actll are prohibited 
from making employment decisions "of their choice" if those decisions are made on 
the basis of national originP The conflict between Article VIII(l) ofthe FCN Treaty 
and Title VII arises when "companies of Japan" are also employers within the scope 
of Title VII and make the hiring decisions permitted by Article VIII(l) on the basis 
of national origin. In such a situation, the Japanese company~ operates within the 
provision of the FCN Treaty, but may at the same time be violating Title VII. 
5. Walker, supra note 3, at 386. Numerous provisions of the Japanese FCN Treaty regulate other 
rights of Japanese companies operating in the United States. See, e.g., Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note 
I, art. 11, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067 (freedom from unlawful molestation); art. IV, id. at 2067 (access to 
courts); art. VI, id. at 2068 (protection of property); art. IX, id. at 2071 (ability to lease property); art. X, 
id. at 2071 (freedom to obtain patents and trademarks). 
6. [d. at 2070 (emphasis added). Many of the modern FCN Treaties concluded since 1946 include 
provisions similar to Article VIII( I} of the Japanese FCN Treaty. See, t.g., the following treaties, supra 
note 2: Ethiopia, art. VIII(5}, 4 U.S.T. 2134, 2141-42, T.l.A.S. No. 2864; Denmark, art. VII(4}, 12 
U.S.T. 908, 915-16, T.l.A.S. No. 4797; France, art. VI(I}, 11 U.S.T. 2398,2405, T.l.A.S. No. 4625; 
Federal Republic of Germany, art. VIII(I}, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1848, T.l.A.S. No. 3593; Greece, art. X11(4}, 
5 U.S.T. 1829, 1857-59, T.l.A.S. No. 3057; Iran, art. IV(4}, 8 U.S.T. 899, 903-04, T.l.A.S. No. 3853; 
Israel, art. VIII( I}, 5 U.S.T. 550, 557, T.l.A.S. No. 2948; Republic of Korea, art. VIII(1}, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 
2223, T.l.A.S. No. 3947; Luxembourg, art. VIII( I}, 14 U.S.T. 251, 257, T.l.A.S. No. 5306; Muscat and 
Oman, art. V(3}, 11 U.S.T. H135, 1838, T.l.A.S. No. 4530; Netherlands, art. VIII(I}, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 
2053, T.l.A.S. No. 3942; Nicaragua, art. VIII(I}, 9 U.S.T. 449, 454-55, T.l.A.S. No. 4024; Republic of 
Viet Nam, art. V(2}, 12 U.S.T. 1703, 1708, T.l.A.S. No. 4890; Kingdom of Thailand, art. IV(6}, 19 
U.S.T. 5843, 5849, T.l.A.S. No. 6540. 
7. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 1981). 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976) (Title VII). Title VII defines employer as any "person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b} (1976). An "industry affecting commerce" is defined by Title VII to include those industries 
or activities which are subject to the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(Landrum-Griffith Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 3, 73 Stat. 520, 29 U.S.C. § 402(c} (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h} 
(1976). In turn, foreign employers have previously been held to be subject to the provisions of the 
Landrum-Griffith Act. See, e.g., The Royal Bank of Canada (San Juan Branch), 67 N.L.R.B. 403, 418 
(1946) (U.S. branch of foreign bank subject to the constraints of the Act). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). 
10. [d. 
II. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b} (1976). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The Act does, however, allow certain discriminatory hiring practices 
if there is a bona fide occupational qualification which requires the practice. [d. 
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The Supreme Court recently confronted such a conflict in Sumitomo Shoji 
America, Inc. v. Avagliano. 13 Several American women and one Japanese woman 
brought suit against their employer, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., a U.S. 
incorporated, wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation. 14 The plain-
tiffs charged that Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens to fill 
certain executive positions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 In 
a unanimous decision, the Court held that since Sumitomo was incorporated in 
the United States, it was not a "company of Japan"16 for purposes of invoking the 
FCN Treaty.17 As an U.S. corporation, the Japanese subsidiary was subject to all 
the hiring constraints Title VII imposes on U.S. corporations. 18 The Court did 
not specifically address the issue of whether a conflict exists between Article 
VIII(l) and Title VIJ.19 The Supreme Court did suggest, however, that 
branches of Japanese corporations, unlike subsidiaries, may be afforded the 
shield of Article VIII( 1) of the FCN Treaty as protection against charges of 
hiring discrimination.20 
This Note examines the conflict between the hiring restraints imposed by Title 
VII in the United States and the FCN Treaty's hiring provisions. An examina-
tion of case law and the purposes behind Title VII and Article VIII( 1) of the 
FCN Treaty suggest methods which may resolve this conflict. An analysis of the 
Sumitomo decision and other related cases illustrates that while the question of 
which entities have standing to invoke Article VIII( 1) is well-settled, exactly what 
rights this treaty provision affords those entities remains unresolved. The lan-
guage of Article VIII(I), as well as its negotiating and legislative history, indicate 
that, at a minimum, Japanese companies operating in the United States are 
permitted to make hiring decisions based upon the citizenship of the applicant; 
such hiring may in fact constitute national origin discrimination. Despite such 
discrimination, Title VII cannot be read to abrogate the rights granted by Article 
VIII(l). Article VIII(1), therefore, serves as a shield against Title VII claims for 
the Japanese company operating in the United States. 
13.457 U.S. 176(1982). 
14. Sumitomo, 457 V.S. at 178. 
15. [d. 
16. Article XXil(3) of the Japanese FeN Treaty defines the term "company" as follows: 
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partnerships, 
companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for 
pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulatlons Wlthm the 
territories of either Party shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the 
other Party. 
4 V.S.T. 2063, 2079-80, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
17. Sumitomo, 457 V.S. at 189. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
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11. THE Sumitomo DECISION 
A. The District Court Opinion 
In Aviglzano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 the plaintiffs alleged employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin, in contravention of Title 
Vll of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,22 and 1866.23 The defendant, though 
organized under the laws of New York, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Japanese company Sumitomo Shoji Kabushiki Kaishai. 24 The subsidiary asserted 
that it was a Japanese company, and that Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty 
allows such companies complete freedom to make hiring decisions, thus provid-
ing an exemption from the requirements of Title VIl. 25 The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York dismissed the Section 1981 claim26 and 
examined the issue of whether a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corpora-
tion can invoke the terms of the FCN Treaty and thus insulate itself from Title 
Vll constraints. 27 
The defendant in the Sumitomo case relied upon Article VIII( 1) of the FCN 
Treaty to justify its hiring practices. Before Sumitomo could invoke the shield of 
Article VlII( 1), however, the company had to prove that it was a Japanese 
company operating in the United States.28 Article XXlI(3) requires that com-
panies be established under Japanese laws to be considered a Japanese company 
for treaty purposes.29 
Sumitomo based its claim of being a "company of Japan" on two major 
21. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); aff'd on other grounds 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated and 
remanded 457 V.S. 176 (J 982). 
22. 42 V.S.c. §§ 2000(e)-2000e-17 (1976). 
23. 42 V.S.C. § 1981 (1976). 
24. The parent corporation is a general trading company or sogo shosha. Sumito1lW, 457 V.S. at 178. 
The function of the general trading company is to market and distribute products manufactured in 
Japan to various nations around the world as well as to import raw materials and certain products into 
Japan. Krause & Sekiguchi, Japan and the World Economy in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How THE JAPANESE 
ECONOMY WORKS, 383, 389-97 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky ed. 1976). These trading companies also 
serve a financial function by lending money and exchanging foreign capital. Id. at 391. The ten largest 
Japanese trading companies, of which Sumitomo's parent is one, handle 50% of japan's exports and 
60% of its imports. Sumitomo, 457 V.S. at 178 n.1. 
25. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 508. 
26. Id. at 513-14. The court's dismissal of the § 1981 claim was based on several factors. First, the 
district court held that § 1981 does not apply to sex discrimination. Second, the court found that this is 
not the type of national origin claim (i.e., one indistinguishable from race discrimination) that is 
actionable under § 1981. Finally, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs would be afforded an adequate 
remedy under Title VII. Id. The § 1981 claim was not revived on appeal. 
27. /d. at 509-13. 
28. Id. 
29. Japanese FeN Treaty,supra note 1, art. XXll(3), 4 V.S.T. 2063, 2079-80, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. For 
the text of Article XXll(3), see supra note 16. 
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grounds.30 First, the defendant looked to a recent State Department letter from 
the Department's Deputy Legal Advisor, Lee R. Marks (Marks Letter) originally 
written in response to queries by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion regarding the treaty.3! The Marks Letter supported Sumitomo's conten-
tion that subsidiaries of Japanese corporations should be considered companies 
of Japan for treaty purposes.32 Second, Sumitomo argued that the court should 
use the criteria employed by the State Department to determine the nationality 
of foreign corporations under its immigration regulations.33 Since the State 
Department considers subsidiaries to be Japanese companies when determining 
the status of individuals employed by such companies who wish to immigrate to the 
United States from Japan,34 Sumitomo urged the court to use these same 
immigration standards to determine the applicability of Article VIU( 1).35 
The district court rejected both of Sumitomo's contentions.36 Although mind-
ful of the doctrine that great weight should be given to the interpretations of 
treaties made by agencies charged with their enforcement,37 the court dismissed 
the Marks Letter since, in the court's opinion, it lacked analysis or reasoning.38 
The court also rejected Sumitomo's claim based on the immigration regula-
tions.39 Instead the court held that the regulations are only to be used to 
determine an individual's immigration status and have no bearing on the juridi-
cal status of the corporation itself.40 
30. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 511-13. 
31. [d. at 511. 
32. ld. The text of the letter reads in part that "[the Department of State] seers] no grounds for 
distinguishing between subsidiaries incorporated in the United States owned and controlled by a 
Japanese company and those operating as unincorporated branches of a Japanese company, nor [does 
the Department] see any policy reason for making the applicability of Article VII dependent on a choice 
of organizational form." Letter from Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, to 
Abner W. Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, October 17, 1978, 
quoted in, Brief for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at Joint Appendix 94, Sumitomo, Shoji (America) v. 
Avaghano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Marks Letter]. 
33. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 510-11. 
34. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1983) (companies of Japan for immigration purposes are those which are 
"principally owned by a person or persons having the nationality of the treaty country .... "). 
35. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 512. 
36. ld. at 513. 
37. [d. at 511, citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1960). The Supreme Court has long 
examined the interpretation given the treaty by those charged with its enforcement, as a tool in 
determining the scope of treaty provisions. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933); 
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913); Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929). 
38. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 511-12. The court stated that "in the absence of analysis or reasoning 
offered by the State Department in support of its position, this court does not find in the letter 
sufficiently persuasive authority to reject the Treaty's clear definition of corporate nationality .... " 
(footnote omitted). ld. 
39. ld. at 512. 
40. [d. at 512 n.14. The court found support for its contention in two other district court decisions, 
Tokyo Sansei v. Esperdy, 298 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (corporate employer, a U.S. incorporated 
subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, did not have standing to sue on behalf of its employees for a 
change in immigration status); Nippon Express U.S.A. v. Esperdy, 261 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
Uapanese employer itself had no power to confer immigration status on any of its employees). 
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The court declared that under the plain definition set forth in Article XXII(3) 
of the FCN Treaty with Japan, Sumitomo was not a "company of Japan" since it 
was not constituted under the laws or regulations of Japan.41 The district court 
interpreted the plain meaning of Article XXII(3) to be that companies incorpo-
rated under the laws of one party to the treaty will be considered a company of 
that party.42 Sumitomo thus could not invoke Article VIIl( 1) of the FCN Treaty 
as a defense against Title VII suits.43 The court found this interpretation consis-
tent with the plain meaning of the treaty,44 and with established principles of 
corporate law.45 In addition, the court found support for this decision in two 
district court cases which construed Article XXII(3) in a similar way.46 The 
district court then held that Sumitomo was subject to the hiring imposed by Title 
VII because it was not a Japanese corporationY In an effort to avoid litigating 
the Title VII claim, Sumitomo sought immediate appeal on the issue of whether 
Article VIlI( 1) protects subsidiaries, as well as branches, from employment 
discrimination claims.48 
B. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal Decision 
The Second Circuit, in analyzing the treaty's definition of "companies of 
Japan," took a broader, more interpretive view and reversed the district court. In 
a unanimous decision written by Judge Mansfield, the court held that sub-
sidiaries of Japanese corporations are "companies of Japan" under the terms of 
the FCN Treaty.49 Although the treaty language suggests the interpretation 
settled on by the district court, i.e., that a company must be organized under 
Japanese law to be a "company of Japan," the appellate court declared that such 
an interpretation overlooked the purpose of the treaty, which was to protect all 
foreign investments.5o It added that interpreting the treaty to exclude Japanese 
subsidiaries from the protection of Article VnI( 1), would "disregard substance 
for form, something which [has been] previously rejected in treaty construc-
tion."51 
41. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 510. 
42. ld. at 509. 
43. ld. at 510. 
44. ld. at 509-10. 
45. ld. Under corporate law principles, the juridical status of a corporation is determined by its place 
of incorporation and not by the nationality of its shareholders. ld.; see Louisville, Cincinnati, & 
Charlestown R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844). 
46. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 510, citing United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. 
Cal. 1957) and Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co., 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979) rev'd 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
47. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 513. 
48. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji (America), 638 F.2d 552, 553 (2d Cir. 1981). 
49. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 554. 
50. [d. at 556. 
51. /d. citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). 
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The court of appeals also stated that an interpretation which does not include 
subsidiaries of Japanese corporations in the definition of "companies of Japan" 
would result in a "crazy quilt pattern"52 of rights granted by the treaty.53 Judge 
Mansfield asserted that if subsidiaries were not considered companies of Japan 
they would not be entitled to access to the courts,54 freedom from molestation,55 
freedom to dispose of property at Will,56 or freedom to obtain patents and 
trademarks. 57 Thus Japanese branches, by virtue of their status as "companies of 
Japan," would be entitled to the rights granted by the treaty - rights which 
would be denied to subsidiaries.58 The Second Circuit found additional support 
for its interpretation by examining the negotiating history of a similar FCN 
Treaty concluded between the United States and the Netherlands which indi-
cated that the definition of "company" was not intended to deny a subsidiary any 
rights granted to its foreign parent.59 The Circuit Court, therefore, concluded 
that the term "companies of Japan" must include subsidiaries.60 
The question on appeal to the Second Circuit was limited to the issue of 
Sumitomo's standing to invoke Article VIII( 1) of the FCN Treaty.61 The court 
reasoned nonetheless that since the parties had briefed and fully argued the 
issue of the scope of Article VIII( 1) as a shield to hiring discrimination claims, 
judicial economy required its resolution.62 It then found that the "of their 
choice" provision in Article VIII( 1) was directed primarily at exempting 
Japanese companies from state laws which placed restrictions upon employment 
of non-citizens within their boundaries and therefore could not be read to 
exempt companies of Japan from Title VII constraints.63 
52. Id. The Second Circuit used this phrase to describe the situation in which certain rights are 
granted by treaty to subsidiaries while other rights are granted to branches. Id. 
53.Id. 
54. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. IV(I), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
55. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VI(2), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2068, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
56. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. IX(4), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2071, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
57. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. X, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2071, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
58. Sumitmno, 638 F.2d at 556. The Second Circuit ignored the fact that subsidiaries, as corporations 
of the United States, would be granted these rights by virtue of that status. Sit, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji 
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982). 
59. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 557. The provisions of the FCN Treaty with the Netherlands are identical 
to those of the Japanese FCN Treaty. Sit Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 
1956, United States-Netherlands, art. VIII(I), 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2055, T.I.A.S. No. 3942. 
60. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 557-58. 
61. Id. at 558 n.6. 
62. Id. The Court explained that "[f]ailure to resolve the question [of the conflict between Article 
VIII(I) and Title VII] would only open the door to a wasteful second appeal after trial below. Under 
these circumstances we are not limited to deciding the question formulated by the district court," citing 
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1975), ctrl. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); 
Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 1975); Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 558 
n.6. 
63. Id. at 559. In making this determination, the court relied upon two sources: Note, Commercial 
Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947, 952-53, 
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The practical consequences of the district and circuit court decisions were 
identical for Sumitomo. At the district court level Sumitomo was barred from 
invoking Article VIII( 1) as a shield to Title VII suits because as an organization 
incorporated in the United States it was not covered by Article VIII(l).64 At the 
circuit court level, Sumitomo was granted standing to invoke Article VIII( 1), but 
the court found that the Article itself could not be used as a shield against Title 
VIl.65 As a result, Sumltomo effectively gained nothing by the appellate deci-
sion and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 66 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Burger, 
held that wholly owned subsidiaries of Japanese corporations are, for treaty 
purposes, U.S. corporations.67 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court 
examined the language of the treaty and the intent of the signatories.68 In 
determining Sumitomo's citizenship for purposes of the treaty, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the language of Article XXII(3) literally, ruling that 
Sumitomo is a U.S. company because it was incorporated in New York.69 
The Court found support for this reading in recent documents exchanged 
between the countries and in documents exchanged at the time the treaty was 
negotiated.70 The Court looked to several sources for the parties' current in-
terpretation of the treaty.71 First, the Court examined two 1982 dispatches 
n.28 (1979); and S. METZGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRADE AND FINANCE: REALITY AND PROSPECT 151 
(1962). The court also relied upon a dispatch sent between Germany and the U.S. State Department 
regarding a similar treaty provision. Foreign Service Dispatch from HICOG, Bonn to Department of 
State, No. 2529, March 18, 1954 quoud in Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent at Joint Appendix 
181a, Sumitomo Shoji (America) v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as German 
Airgram]. 
64. Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 513. 
65. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 554. 
66. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 179-80. The Fifth Circuit, in a case with facts nearly identical to those in 
Sumitomo, came down in the same way as the Second Circuit on the issue of the subsidiary's standing as a 
"company of Japan." Spiess v. C. Itoh America, 643 F.2d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 1981). On the issue of 
whether Article VUI(I) shields companies of Japan from hiring discrimination suits, however, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in the affirmative. The court looked to the negotiating history of the treaty and to several 
articles written at the time by a treaty negotiator. See Walker, supra note 3; Walker, Trealles for 
Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMPo L. 229 
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Walker, United Stales Practice], to support its literal reading of the treaty 
provision. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 361. 
67. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189. 
68. Id. at 180, citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (An American trust was not 
exempt from Federal income taxation by virtue of the United States/United Kingdom Income Tax 
Convention even though the trust beneficiaries were British subjects); and The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 1,72 (1821). 
69. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182. 
70. Id. at 183-87. 
71. Id. 
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between the governments of the United States and Japan.72 In reference to the 
Sumitomo case, both governments reconfirmed their view that the place of incor-
poration test13 is the correct method for determining the juridical status of 
corporations for treaty purposes.74 In addition, the Court, citing the principle 
that the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the government agency 
charged with its enforcement should be afforded great weight,75 looked to the 
latest State Department interpretation of Article XXU(3).76 The opinions ex-
pressed in this document also support an interpretation excluding subsidiaries 
from Article VIU(l) coverage.77 The intent of the signatories during negotia-
tions was also found to be consistent with a literal reading of the treaty.78 The 
Court found that the United States and Japan intended that companies of each 
party be accorded the same treatment regardless of their nationality.79 The 
72. Id. at 183-84. 
73. The "place of incorporation" test, used by most U.S. courts, stipulates that a corporation is a 
citizen of the state where it is incorporated. Louisville, Cincinnati Be Charlestown RR. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 
(2 Howe) 497,555 (1844). Set also HORNSTEIN, CORPORATE LAw AND PRACTICE 281 (1959). This test is 
also the one generally applied in international law and was articulated by the International Court of 
Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light Be Power Co., (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 42 ("The traditional 
rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the state under the laws of 
which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have been 
confirmed by long standing practice and by numerous international instruments.").Id. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 27 (1965). In contrast to the U.S. and international law rule, civil law 
jurisdictions determine the citizenship of a corporation by the center of corporate activity or the 
corporate seat as designated in the corporate charter. Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enter-
prises, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 983, 986 (1952); Walker, supra note 3, at 381; Hadari, The Choice of Natiunal 
Law Applicable to the Multi_ti01llJI Enterprise and the Natiunality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1,7-11 
(1974); Vagts, The Multi1llJtio1llJ1 Enterprise: A New Challenge for Trans1llJti01llJI Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 739, 
740-41 (1970). 
74. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183-84, citing State Deparment Cable, Tokyo No. 03300, February 26, 1982 
(relaying the position of the Ministry of Mfairs of Japan to the U.S. State Department) ("[a) subsidiary 
of a Japanese company incorporated under the laws of New York is not covered by Article 8 Paragraph 
1 when it operates in the United States."), and citing Diplomatic Communication from the Embassy of 
Japan in Washington to the United States Department of State, April 21, 1982 (reconfirming Japanese 
view that entitites incorporated in the United States are U.S. corporations for treaty purposes). 
75. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85. See supra note 37. 
76. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-81'. The court found that although the letter upon which it relied for 
support, Letter of James R. At~ood, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, to Lutz 
Alexander Prager, Assistant General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sep-
tember I, 1979, quoted in Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent at Joi;'t Appendix 98a, Sumitomo Shoji 
(America) v. A vagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as AlWood Letter), conflicted with the Marks 
Letter, supra note 32, an earlier piece of State Department correspondence, both letters are inconclusive 
and not indicative of the state of mind of the treaty negotiators. The Sumitomo Court relied on the Atwood 
Letter, however, since it was the most recent interpretation by the State Department. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 
184. 
77. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184 n.l0. 
78. Id. at 185-89. 
79. Id. at 185. The Court looked to several articles written by a treaty negotiator shortly after the 
ratification of the treaty, Walker, supra note 3, Walker, supra note 2, as well as Congressional Hearings 
regarding ratification, Commercial Treaties: Hearing on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigatiun 
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Court determined that treating subsidiaries as domestic companies would carry 
out the purpose and intent of the signatory parties.80 
The Supreme Court in Sumitomo pointed out that any.other interpretation of 
the plain meaning of the treaty language, e.g., that corporate citizenship is 
determined by nationality of the stockholders, would be inconsistent with other 
treaty provisions.8l The Court explained that the drafters of the treaty utilized 
two terms to distinguish the status of corporations for treaty purposes - "com-
panies of either party" and "enterprises of one party controlled by companies of 
the other party."82 For example, Article VII(l) permits companies and nationals 
of either party to control or acquire majority interest in companies of the other 
party, while Article XVI(2) refers to articles produced by companies of either 
party or by enterprises controlled by such companies.83 Were the nationality of a 
corporation to be determined by a test other than "place of incorporation,"84 the 
further designation of "enterprises controlled by companies of either party" 
would be superfluous and unwarranted.85 Thus, if the nationality of a corpora-
tion were determined by the nationality of its controlling interest, there would be 
no need to designate rights to "enterprises of one country controlled by com-
panies of the other."86 
Finally, the Supreme Court refuted the Circuit Court's "crazy quilt" argu-
ment87 by explaining that subsidiaries would not be denied access to courts, 
freedom from molestation or the ability to obtain patents because, as U.S. 
corporations, they would enjoy all the treaty rights granted to companies of 
Japan by virtue of their status as a domestic corporation.88 The Court concluded 
by stating that "[t]he only significant advantage that branches may have over 
subsidiaries is that conferred by Article VIII(I)."89 In this manner, the Court 
reversed the Second Circuit on the issue of standing to invoke Article 'VIII( 1), 
and held that subsidiaries incorporated in the United States are not Japanese 
companies for treaty purposes.90 But, the Court left open the question of 
Between the United States and Colmnhia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark and Greece Before a Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Hearing), 
in making this determination. 
80. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188. 
81. Id. at 182 n.8. 
82. Id.; see also SjMss, 643 F.2d at 365 (dissenting opinion). 
83. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note 1, art. XVI(2), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2076, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
84. For example, one might use the nationality of shareholders or the "seat" of the corporation test as 
delineated supra in note 73. 
85. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182 n.8. Spuss, 643 F.2d at 365-67. See also Japanese FCN Treaty, supra 
note 1, arts. VI(3) and VII(4), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 for other references to 
enterprises controlled by companies. 
86. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182 n.8. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58. 
88. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189. 
89.Id. 
9O.Id. 
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whether Article VIII( 1) will in fact insulate a branch of a Japanese corporation 
from liability for discrimination in hiring practices.91 
D. Current Law Construing Article VIII(l) 
This question is by no means settled under current law, and the Circuits are 
divided on the issue of whether Article VIII( 1) exempts "companies of Japan" 
from Title VII. Although the Second Circuit in Sumitomo found that Article 
VIII(I) did not exempt Japanese companies from Title VII,92 the Fifth Circuit 
differed in its approach to this question.93 
In Spiess v. C. Itoh (America) Inc.,94 the plaintiffs, American employees of a U.S. 
incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, charged employment dis-
crimination as a result of the subsidiary's practice of hiring only Japanese citizens 
to fill its managerial positions.95 After finding that the subsidiary was a Japanese 
company for treaty purposes,96 the Spiess court read the language of Article 
VIII( 1) literally so as to allow Japanese corporations to hire executives "of their 
choice" regardless of Title VIJ.97 The Fifth Circuit, as did the Second Circuit, 
based its determination upon the language of the provision and the intent of the 
negotiating parties. 98 In addition, the Fifth Circuit looked to the same sources as 
the Second Circuit in determining the intent of the negotiating parties.99 Al-
though the Spiess court recognized, as the Second Circuit had, that the "of their 
choice" provision was aimed at exempting Japanese companies from state court 
percentile restrictions, 1oo it held that Article VIU( 1) must also be read literally to 
exempt companies of Japan from Title VIJ.101 The single dissent in Spiess did 
not reach the question whether Article VIII(l) shields branches from Title VII 
constraints but suggested in dicta that it might. 102 
The only other case construing the hiring of a FCN treaty arose in 
the Eastern District of New York and called into ~luestion the FCN Treaty with 
91. [d. 
92. See supra notes 61 to 63 and accompanying text. 
93. See Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359-63. 
94. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981). 
95. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 355. 
96. [d. at 358-59. However, the Spi£ss Court failed to note that the airgram to which it looked for 
support in this decision explicitly stated that, for treaty purposes, the nationality of a company is 
determined by its place of incorporation. Airgram from Department of State to American Embassy in 
Tokyo, No. A-105, January 9, 1976, qw>ted in Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent at Joint Appendix 
157a, Sumitomo Shoji (America) v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Airgram]; 
Spiess, 643 F.2d at 357. 
97. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359. 
98. [d. at 359-63. 
99. For a list of these sources, see supra note 63. 
100. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
101. SPiess, 643 F.2d at 362. The Court reasoned that to restrict the meaning of the "of the choice" 
provision to only overriding state law would render the provision meaningless. [d. 
102. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 369. 
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Denmark. l03 In Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.,104 plaintiff, an American male 
employee of defendant, a Danish corporation and its subsidiary, alleged Title 
VII hiring discrimination against his employer. los In finding that Article VII( 4) 
of the FCN Treaty with Denmark does not exempt companies of Denmark from 
Title VII constraints,lOG the court looked to Senate hearingsl07 regarding two 
other treaties (Haiti lOB and Iran l09) with provisions identical to the FCN Treaty 
with Denmark, and determined that the purpose of the "of their choice" provi-
sion was to facilitate admission of specialized employees from foreign countries 
and not to exempt foreign corporations from Title VIl.1l0 
As the previous discussion illustrates, U.S. incorporated subsidiaries of 
Japanese corporations are not companies of Japan for treaty purposes and 
therefore do not have standing to invoke the provisions of Article VIII(l). 
However, were an enterprise established as a Japanese company for treaty 
purposes, the circuits do not agree on what hiring privileges would accrue to 
such a company. The Second Circuit in Sumitomo, as well as the District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York in Linskey, read the treaty provision as granting 
only such freedoms as U.S. corporations possess, while the Fifth Circuit in Spiess 
read Article VIlI( 1) very broadly, as a grant of exemption from Title VII 
constraints. An analysis of the treaty and its history suggest that resolution of the 
conflict between the circuits is possible. 
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TITLE VII AND ARTICLE VIlle 1) 
A. The Definition of "Companies of Japan " 
For a corporation to be able to invoke the provisions of Article VIlle 1) of the 
FCN Treaty with Japan, it must be a "compan[y] of either party engag[ing 
personnel] within the territories of the other party .... "111 Under the definition 
103. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. I, 1951, United States-Denmark, 12 
U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797 [hereinafter cited as Danish FCN Treaty]. Article VII(4) of the Danish 
FCN Treaty is nearly identical to Article VIII(3) of the Japanese FCN Treaty. However, there is one 
important difference - the Denmark treaty states that "companies of either Party" may engage certain 
executive personnel "of their choice, regardless of nationality." Danish FCN Treaty, supra, 12 U.S. T. 908, 
915-16, T.I.A.S. No. 4797 (emphasis added). 
104. 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
105. Linskey, 470 F. Supp. at 1182. Since one of the defendants was a Danish corporation, the court 
did not consider the issue of whether subsidiaries are "corporations of Denmark" for purposes of the 
treaty. /d. at 1185. 
106. [d. at 1186. 
107. Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation with Haiti and Iran, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
108. The treaty with Haiti is not in force today. Linskey, 470 F. Supp. at 1186 n.6. 
109. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 
8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853. 
110. Linskey, 470 F. Supp at 1186. The court did not cite any of the sources noted in Spiess or in 
Sumitomo which illuminate the negotiating history of the Japanese treaty. 
Ill. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VIII( I), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
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of "companies of either Party" which is contained in Article XXII(3) of the 
treaty, an enterprise is a company of the country under whose laws it has been 
constituted.nz 
Based on the language of Article XXII(3), a branch of a Japanese corporation 
will be considered a company of Japan for the purpose of invoking the Article 
VIII( I) hiring provisions if it was "constituted under the applicable laws of 
Japan." 
In the Sumitomo case the Supreme Court read Article XXII(3) literally, holding 
that a company's place of incorporation determines its nationality.na Under such 
an interpretation the unincorporated branch of a Japanese corporation operat-
ing in the United States would be a Japanese company and would, therefore, 
have standing to invoke Article VIII(l). This interpretation is supported by the 
U.S. State Department. In two recent letters sent by the State Department to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission"4 concerning the interpretation 
of the FCN Treaty, the State Department concurred in the view that branches 
are companies of Japan for treaty purposes.ns 
Therefore, based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sumitomo, branches 
have standing to invoke Article VIII( I). 
B. The Scope of the Rights Granted by Article VII/(l) 
The Circuit Courts which have examined this question differ in their interpre-
tation of the scope of the protection which Article VIII(I) affords Japanese 
companies.n6 The Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to hold that a literal reading of 
this provision would allow foreign employers to determine "which executives 
and technicians will manage their investment in the [United States] without 
regard to [U.S.] laws.""7 The Second Circuit, however, in a far narrower in-
terpretation, has determined that the provisions cannot be read even so literally 
as to allow Japanese companies to make hiring decisions "of their choice" if 
domestic companies would be denied freedom to make the same choice due to 
Title VII constraints."s In attempting to reconcile the conflicting approaches to 
the scope of Article VIII(I) taken by the Fifth and Second Circuits, the issue is 
whether Article VIII( I) grants Japanese companies any rights greater than those 
afforded domestic corporations in the employment area. 
112. [d. at 2079, T.1.A.S. No. 2863. For the text of Article XXll(3), see supra note 16. 
WI. 457 U.S. at 182. 
114. Marks Letter, supra note 32, and Atwood Letter, supra note 76. 
115. [d. 
116. Cmnpare supra notes 61 to 63 and accompanying text with notes 97 to 101 and accompanying 
text. 
117. SIMss, 643 F.2d at 361. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see supra text accompanying 
notes 97 to 101. 
118. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 558. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see supra text accompanying 
notes 61 to 66. 
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1. The Meaning of Article V III( 1) 
The FeN treaty series was the first major treaty series to provide for the 
rights of corporations in addition to detailing the rights afforded nationals of the 
parties to the treaty.119 FeN treaties were concluded to afford foreign corpora-
tions "national treatment" -when operating within the territories of the other 
party.l20 "National treatment" as defined by the FeN Treaty with Japan means 
the same treatment afforded domestic corporations in similar circumstances.121 
Article VII of the FeN Treaty with Japan, which the treaty negotiators termed 
the "heart of the treaty,"122 summarizes the notion that companies of either 
party are entitled to treatment on a par with domestic corporations with respect 
to all phases of their operation. l23 As Article VII illustrates, the central theme 
within the treaty is equal (rather than better) treatment for companies of Japan 
operating in the United States. l24 
With respect to Article VIII(l), however, the negotiators of the treaty may 
have intended to grant more than just "national treatment" in the employment 
area.125 "[I]n the matter of employment, provisions have been developed techni-
cally going beyond national treatment, to prevent the imposition of ultra-
nationalistic policies with respect to essential executive and technical person-
nel."126 In distinguishing between the national treatment standard and that used 
in the employment provisions of Article VIII(I), one treaty negotiator termed 
these standards either "contingent" or "non-contingent."127 When the contin-
gent standard is used, the treaty grants foreign corporations rights equal to, and 
contingent upon, either the treatment domestic corporations receive under U.S. 
law (national treatment) or the treatment rendered to corporations of foreign, 
non-party countries operating in the United States (most-favored-nation treat-
ment).l28 When the treaty accords rights on a noncontingent basis, the foreign 
corporation is given an absolute right, regardless of the treatment afforded 
119. Walker, supra note 3, at 380; Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359. 
120. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 186; Walker, supra note 3, at 385. 
121. Japanese FCN Treaty,supra note 1, art. XXII(I), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2079, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. The 
text of this article provides as follows: "The term 'national treatment' means treatment accorded within 
the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like 
situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of such Party." 
ld. 
122. Airgram from the Department of State to USPOLAD, Tokyo, No. A-453, January 7, 1952, 
quoted in Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent at Joint Appendix 130a, Sumitomo Shoji (America) v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Japanese Airgram]. 
123. Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VIl(I), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. See 
supra note 4, for the text of Article VIl(I). 
124. Walker, supra note 3, at 380. 
125. See,e.g., Walker, supra note 3, and U.S. Airgram,supra note 96. Herman Walker,Jr. was one of 
the negotiators of the Japanese FCN Treaty. 
126. Walker, supra note 3, at 386. 
127. Walker, supra note 2, at 811. 
128.ld. 
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domestic corporations or corporations of non-party countries. 129 Although the 
vast majority of rights granted by the treaty are granted on a contingent basis,t30 
the employment provisions make no mention of national or most-favored-nation 
treatment on their face 131 and, as a result, fall into the category of rights granted 
on a non-contingent basis.132 Since Article VIII(l) rights are not contingent 
upon the treatment domestic corporations receive under U.S. law, United States 
employment statutes cannot be used as a guide in determining the limits of 
Article VIII( 1).133 As a result, the language of Article VIII( 1) and its negotiating 
and legislative histories will determine the scope of the rights involved. 
An examination of the negotiating history of Article VIII(l) reveals that one 
of its purposes was to grant Japanese companies an exemption from state laws, in 
place at the time the treaty was negotiated, which were aimed at restricting the 
employment of aliens in certain professions.134 Numerous states had enacted 
statutes which barred or severely restricted non-citizen employment in those 
states.13S Subsequent to the ratification of the FCN Treaty one treaty negotiator 
noted that Article VIII assures "management ... freedom of choice in the 
engaging of essential executive and technical employees in general ... without 
legal interference from 'percentile' restrictions and the like."136 The negotiating 
history of Article V1II(l) in the German FCN treaty,137 which is identical to 
Article VIII(I) in the Japanese treaty,13S lends support to this interpretation. 
The understanding between the parties to the German FCN treaty with regard 
to the hiring provision was that "[i]ts major special purpose is to preclude the 
imposition of 'percentile' legislation. It gives freedom of choices among persons 
lawfully present in the country and occupationally qualified under the local 
law."139 
The negotiating history as well as the legislative history of the FCN Treaty with 
Japan indicate that Article VIII( 1) was also intended to give Japanese companies 
complete freedom to hire their own citizens. Article VIII did not merely exempt 
such companies from specific state laws. The Supreme Court has warned that 
although the language of FCN treaties may be similar, their negotiating his-
129. [d. 
130. Su, e.g., japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, arts. Ill, IV, VI(4), VII, VIII(3), IX, X, XII, XIII, 
XIV, XVI, XIX(4), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067, 2067-68, 2069, 2069-70, 2070, 2071, 2071, 2072-73, 2073, 
2074, 2076, 2077, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
131. For the text of Article VIlI(I), see supra text accompanying note 6. 
132. Walker, supra note 3, at 386. 
133. See Spiess, 643 F.2d at 360-61. 
134. japanese Airgram, supra note 122. 
135. [d. 
136. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 66. 
137. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, October 29, 1954, United States-West Ger-
many, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter cited as German FCN Treaty]. 
138. Compare German FCN Treaty, supra note 137, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1848, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 with 
japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
139. German Airgram, supra note 63. 
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tories may give rise to differing interpretations. 14o An examination of the 
negotiating history of Article VIII of the Japanese FCN Treaty reveals an 
understanding between the parties that Article VIII(2)141 rather than Article 
VIII( 1) served to exempt these companies from state employment statutes. 142 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the treaty negotiators understood 
Article VIII( 1) to grant freedom of choice in the hiring of executive personnel 
"in general, regardless of their nationality."143 
The view that the signatories intended Article VII1( 1) to permit Japanese 
companies to make hiring decisions based upon nationality gains further sup-
port from the legislative history surrounding the ratification of the treaty. 144 
The Senate Executive Report on the Japanese treaty and several other FCN 
treaties145 indicates that the purpose of Article VIII( 1) was to free up restrictions 
on nationality based hiring.146 Although the 1953 Senate Hearings regarding the 
Japanese treaty147 make only fleeting and unexplained reference to the "of 
140. Sumifmno, 457 U.S. at 185 n.12. 
141. Article VIII(2) of the Japanese FCN treaty, provides as follows: 
Nationals of either Party shall not be barred from practicing the professions within the 
territories of the other Party merely by reason of their alienage; but they shall be permitted to 
engage in professional activities therein upon compliance with the requirements regarding 
qualifications, residence and competence that are applicable to nationals of such other Party. 
Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VIII(2), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
142. Sumifomo, 457 U.S. at 185 n.12. The negotiators explained to the Japanese that all states 
required citizenship for attorneys, thirteen states required citizenship for physicians and for engineers, 
in addition to random restrictions for various other professions. Japanese Airgram, supra note 122. The 
differing interpretations by the signatories of the identical Article VIII( I) language contained in the 
Japanese and German Treaties may be attributed to the fact that the German FCN Treaty does not 
include the Article VIII(2) provision contained in the Japanese Treaty. Compare the Japanese FCN 
Treaty, supra note I, art. VIII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, with the German FCN Treaty, 
supra note 137, art. VIII, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. The hiring provision contained in 
Article VII(4) of the Danish Treaty which was at issue in Linskey, see supra notes 113-20 and accompany-
ing text, is substantially different from Article VIII of the Japanese Treaty, so as to distinguish the 
reasoning in Linskey from the situation at issue here. Compare the Danish FCN Treaty, supra note 103, 
art. VII, 12 U.S.T. 908, 914-15, T.I.A.S. No. 4797 with the Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VIII, 
4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
143. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 66, at 234. 
144. For another analysis of this issue see Note, supra note 63. 
145. TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, S. EXEC. Doc. No.5, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953). 
[d. 
146. !d. at 4. The text of the report provides in relevant part: 
Article VIII: Paragraph I of this article states that companies doing business in the territory of 
the other party may hire "accountants and other technical experts" attorneys, agents etc., of 
their choice and the laws regarding the nationality of employees are not to prevent such 
nationals and companies from carrying on their activities in connection with the planning and 
operation of the specific enterprises with which they are connected. 
147. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter cited as 1953 Hearing]. 
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their choice" provisions,148 the 1952 Senate Hearings regarding several other 
FCN treaties149 do address the issue. In summarizing the provisions of Article 
VIII of the FCN Treaty with Israell50 one Senator explained that "Article VIII 
apparently is an attempt to give great latitude and privilege to nationals of either 
party to use their own technical and professional experts within the territories of 
the other."lsl As the preceding analysis illustrates, Article VIII( 1) must be read 
to permit Japanese companies operating in the United States to hire their own 
citizens for certain executive positions within these companies. 
2. The Conflict Between Article VIII(1) Rights and Title VII Restraints 
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing CO.IS2 is the sole Supreme Court case which 
examines the issue of citizenship discrimination as a basis for Title VII claims. 
Plaintiff in Espinoza, a Mexican citizen and resident alien of the United States, 
applied and was rejected for a position with defendant, allegedly on the basis of 
defendant's policy against employment of aliens.153 Plaintiff alleged that this 
policy constituted discrimination based upon national origin. l54 Defendant 
countered by explaining that its employment practices could not constitute 
national origin discrimination since persons of Mexican ancestry constituted 
96 per cent of its work force. 15S 
In determining whether the citizenship requirement in this case constituted 
national origin discrimination, the Court began by defining national origin as 
"the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which 
his or her ancestors came."l56 Under such a definition the Court held that 
citizenship in the instant case did not constitute national origin discrimination 
148. /d. at 2. The text of the 1953 Hearing states in relevant part that "of special concern to investors 
are such assurances as those regarding . . . the right of the owner to manage his own affairs and 
employ persoDliei of his choice .... " 
149. 19'2 Htaring, supra note 79. 
150. The FCN Treaty with Israel, art. VIII, 5 U.S.T. 550,558-59, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, is identical to 
the Japanese FCN Treaty, supra note I, art. VIII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 
151. 19'2 HUlring, supra note 79, at 38. 
152. 414 U.S. 86 (1973). 
153. EspinoUJ, 414 U.S. at 87. To establish a prima facie case of hiring discrimination under Title VII, 
plaintiff must plead and prove that he applied and was rejected for a position on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
154. EspinoUJ, 414 U.S. at 87. 
155. [d. at 92-93. 
156. [d. at 88. The Court in EspinoUJ looked to the legislative history of Title VII for support for this 
contention. Though admitting that the history on this point was sparse, the Court cited a definition 
given by Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of the House Subcommittee which reported on Title VII, 
as follows: "[national origin] means the country from which you or your forebears came ... You may 
come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France or any other country." /d. at 89, citing 110 CONGo 
REc. 2549 (1964). 
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for purposes of the statute, since 96 percent of those filling the job for which the 
plaintiff had applied were of the same national origin as the plaintiff.157 
The Court went on to limit this holding, however, by citing certain instances in 
which a hiring preference based on citizenship might constitute national origin 
discrimination. ISS Title VII would proscribe hiring based on citizenship where 
such a practice has the "purpose or effect" of national origin discrimination. ls9 
The Court stated that "[c]ertainly Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis 
of national origin. 'The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.' "160 
The very situation which the Espinoza court warned might constitute national 
origin discrimination, i.e., a citizenship classification having the effect of national 
origin discrimination, occurred in the Sumitomo case. The Supreme Court indi-
cated in Sumitomo that hiring Japanese citizens exclusively to fill certain execu-
tive positions may have the requisite "purpose or effect" which could constitute 
national origin discrimination. 161 Since Article VIII( 1) allows Japanese com-
panies to hire Japanese citizens to the exclusion of all others, the effect of such a 
practice is to create discrimination against anyone not of Japanese national 
origin. 162 The Sumitomo Court declined to decide this issue since the question 
was not certified for interlocutory appeal by the court of appeals. 163 The 
Supreme Court noted, however, that the district court had treated the type of 
discrimination at issue in Sumitomo as national origin discrimination. 164 The 
157. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92-93. The Court also asserted that Congress probably did not intend the 
type of citizenship discrimination at issue in Espinoza to contravene Title VII since the Federal govern-
ment has had the long standing policy of restricting certain service positions to U.S. citizens only. Jd. at 
89-93. 
158. Jd. at 92. 
159. [d. The Court gave two examples of possible exceptions to their holding in Espinoza. Where 
citizenship discrimination is part of a larger plan to discriminate, or where it is used as a pretext to hide 
actual national origin discrimination, the Court suggested that a citizenship requirement may in fact 
constitute national origin discrimination. 
160. ld., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (where application exams were racially 
neutral but had the effect of excluding blacks, the exams were held to constitute hiring discrimination). 
The single dissent in Espinoza, written by justice Douglas, would have characterized this type of 
discrimination as "based on birth outside the United States and [would) thus [be) discrimination based 
on national origin in violation of Title VII." Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 97, quoting Brief for Commission as 
Amicus Curiae at 5. Douglas felt that any other construction of Title VII would contravene the 
Congressional policy behind Title VII - to eliminate hiring practices which create "artificial, arbitrary 
or unnecessary" impediments to employment. [d. at 98, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 
U.S. 792 (1973). 
161. 457 U.S. at 180 n.4. 
162. The japanese are an extremely homogeneous group - fully 99% of the population is of 
japanese origin. D. WHITAKER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR JAPAN 70 (American Univ. Foreign Area Studies, 
1974). See also E. REISHAUER, THE JAPANESE, 34-35 (1977). For a different approach to this problem, see 
Note, supra note 63, at 957-58. 
163. 457 U.S. at 180 n.4. 
164. Jd. Nowhere in the district court opinion is there an express analysis of the citizenship/national 
origin question. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim on the basis that 
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Court justified the district court's treatment of Sumitomo's hiring practices by 
quoting the principle elucidated in Espinoza that hiring based on citizenship may 
violate Title VII where it has the effect of national origin discrimination.165 
Thus, Article VIII( 1) permits Japanese companies to make hiring decisions 
which have the effect of national origin discrimination and as a result contravene 
the provisions of Title VII. 
C. Resolution of the Conflict Between Article VIII( l) and Title VII 
Under U.S. law, a treaty is considered, as are federal statutes, the supreme law 
of the land.166 The Supreme Court has carefully scrutinized conflicts between 
treaty provisions and subsequently enacted legislation. 167 It is well established 
that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains."168 In examining possible conflicts, 
the Supreme Court will try to find any way in which the treaty and statute can be 
construed consistently and will only invalidate an enactment when there is a 
"positive repugnancy" - clearly conflicting language on the face of the statute 
and the treaty.169 "Absent explicit statutory language, [the Supreme Court has] 
been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights."17o 
As a result, the Supreme Court will not uphold a repeal by implication. 171 
However, once the language of the treaty is found to be inconsistent with a 
subsequently enacted statute, the inconsistent treaty provisions are held to be 
void.172 
At issue in the case of Morton v. Mancari l73 was a conflict between Section 12 
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934174 (Section 12) and the Equal Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972175 (1972 Act). Section 12 allows the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(Bureau)176 to give preferential treatment to Indians when making hiring deci-
it is not exempt from Title VII by way of the treaty, but simply referred to the the type of hiring 
practices alleged as national origin discrimination. See Sumitamo, 473 F. Supp. at 508-13. 
165. Sumitomo, 487 U.S. at 180 n.4. 
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
167. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
168. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See also Cook v. United States, 228 U.S. 
102 (1933). 
169. Tennesee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1977); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 342, 363 (1842). 
170. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658, 
690 (1979). 
171. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 549. 
172. Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 324 (1903); Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 
173. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
174. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-486 (1976). 
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). 
176. The Act refers to only the "Indian Office" as the department permitted to maintain preferential 
hiring practices. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976). However, the 1979 amendment to the Indian Reorganization 
Act makes the Indian preference laws applicable to the Bureau ofindian Affairs. Pub. L. No. 96-135, § 2, 93 
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sions.177 The congressional purpose in enacting Section 12 was to accord In-
dians a greater voice in self-government.178 The 1972 Act was promulgated to 
extend the provisions of Title Vll to employment discrimination in most areas of 
federal employment.179 Although Title VB specifically exempts employment of 
Indians on or near an Indian reservation from its prohibitions,I8o the 1972 Act 
makes no mention, either on its face or in its legislative history, of preferential 
hiring of Indians by the federal government or its agencies.181 A conflict between 
Section 12 and the 1972 Act thus arises when the Indian Office, pursuant to 
Section 12, preferentially hires Indians and, as a result, discriminates against 
those of other national origins in contravention of the 1972 Act.182 
Plaintiffs, non-Indian employees of the Bureau, brought suit against the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and several others,I83 charging that Section 12 
had been repealed by the 1972 Act.184 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
decision written by Justice Blackmun, disagreed, holding that the two Acts could 
coexist.185 The rationale for the Court's approach was based upon several 
grounds. First, the Court felt that although the 1972 Act made no mention of 
Indian preference,I86 the exception for employment on Indian reservations 
Act makes the Indian preference laws applicable to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Pub. L. 96-135, § 2, 93 
Stat. 1057 (1979), 25 U.S.C. § 472a (Supp. III 1979). 
177. Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act provides: 
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age, character, 
experience, knowledge and ability for Indians who may be appointed to the various positions 
maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the administration of functions or 
services affecting any Indian Tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference 
to appointment to vacancies in any such position. 
June 18, 1934, c. 576, § 12, 48 Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976). 
178. Morton, 417 U.S. at 541-43. In making this determination, the Court looked to the legislative 
history of the Act. Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Bqore the Senate Cmnmittee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 256 (1934) (remarks of co-sponsor Senator Wheeler to the effect that the purpose of the Indian 
Reorganization Act was to assist the Indians in self government); H.R. REp. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1934). (It is the obligation of the United States to provide the Indians with the right to political 
liberty and self govet:nment). 
179. Morton, 417 U.S. at 546-47. The 1972 Act provides, in relevant part: "All personnel actions 
affecting employees or applicants for employment [in certain government positions) ... shall be made 
free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
180. Title VII excludes "an Indian Tribe" from its definition of "employer," providing in relevant 
part that: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an 
Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such 
business or enterprise under which a perferential treatment is given to any individual because 
he is an Indian living on or near a reservation. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976). 
181. Morton, 417 U.S. at 547. 
182. See id. at 539. 
183. The defendants included the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau Directors for the 
Albuquerque and Navajo Area as well as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 547. 
186. Id. 
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contained in Title VII was some indication that Congress intended to favor the 
employment of Indians where Indian affairs were involved.187 Second, the 
Court noted the longstanding federal policy affording preferential hiring treat-
ment to Indians/ 88 as an indication that Congress intended to maintain Section 
12.189 Finally the Court looked to the principle that repeals by implication are 
not favored l90 and can only be effectuated where the earlier and later are 
irreconcilable.191 Further, the Court held that "[w]here there is no clear inten-
tion otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 
one, regardless of the priority of enactment."192 Finding that Section 12 is a 
specific statute oflimited application while the 1972 Act is general in application, 
the Court held that the two must coexist.193 Although the 1972 Act proscribes 
national origin discrimination in federal employment, the Court held that Sec-
tion 12 preferential hiring is permitted as an exception to the 1972 Act.194 
Examining Article VIII(I) against the principles outlined in Morton, Article 
VIU( 1) must be read as an exception to the hiring constraints imposed by Title 
VB. As noted in the Spiess decision, nothing in the legislative history of Title VII 
or on the face of the statute indicates a congressional intent to abrogate Article 
VIB(l) of the FCN Treaty with Japan. 195 The Fifth Circuit in Spiess held that 
[n]o evidence suggests that Congress intended to repudiate Article 
VBI(l) when it enacted Title VII. Domestic employment discrimina-
tion laws occupy a high prionty on the nation's agenda and courts 
often resolve statutory conflicts in their favor. In this case, however, 
resolving doubts in favor of Title VB would go beyond the judicial 
sphere of interpretation. In the absence of Congressional guidance, 
we decline to abrogate the American government's solemn undertak-
ing with respect to a foreign nation. 196 
187. Id. at 547-48. 
188. Justice Blackmun points out that for many years prior to the enactment of the 1972 Act, 
Executive Orders forbidding employment discrimination within the federal government made an 
exception for Indian preferences within the Bureau. Further, the Justice noted that three months after 
the enactment of the 1974 Act, Congress promulgated two additional Indian preference laws. Id. at 
548-49. 
189. Id. 
190. Id.at 549, citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Wood v. United States, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342-43, 363 (1842); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan 
Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968). 
191. Murttm, 417 U.S. at 550, citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945). 
192. Murttm, 417 U.S. at 550-51, citing, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 
(1961); Rogers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1902). 
193. Morton, 417 U.S. at 551. 
194. Id. 
195. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 362. S •• supra notes 94 to 99 and accompanying text. 
196. Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit's analysis clearly shows that Congress did not intend to repeal 
Article VIII( 1) when it enacted Title VII. 
Although Article VIII(l) and Title VII appear to be irreconcilable since Title 
VII prohibits the very hiring practices which Article VIII( 1) allows, the treaty 
provision can still stand under the specific statute/general statute rationale 
adopted in Morton. Article VIII(l), like the Section 12 provision at issue in 
Morton, is a specific enactment of limited scope aimed at aiding a very specific 
and limited group of persons. Just as Section 12 was enacted to grant Indians 
greater control over self-government, so too Article VIII(l) was included in the 
Japanese treaty to afford the foreign company greater control over its hold-
ings.197 Moreover, both Title VII and the 1972 Act are statutes of general scope 
which proscribe discrimination in the employment area. Based on the principles 
expounded in Morton v. Mancari, a Title VII type statute which is general in 
scope cannot abrogate a specific enactment of the Article VIII( 1) variety, absent 
congressional intent to do so, regardless of the order of enactment. As a result, 
Article VIII( 1) must stand regardless of the provisions of Title VIJ.198 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined the relationship between Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty with Japan. It is settled case 
law that only "companies of Japan" have standing to invoke Article VIll( 1) and 
197. See supra notes 119 to 124 and accompanying text. 
198. Japanese companies may be motivated to take advantage of the Article VIl( I) hiring provisions 
because of Japanese culture and society. The Japanese have traditionally been wary of foreigners and 
foreign customs. This chauvinism grew up out of the period of isolation in Japanese society. One 
commentator pointed out that Japanese executives who serve as managers in foreign offices at times 
find it necessary to denounce any value derived from their foreign sojourn to prove their loyalty to the 
Japanese .employer. E. REtSCHAUER, supra note 162, at 403-06. 
Since the Supreme Court.concluded in Sumitomo that branches rather than subsidiaries of Japanese 
companies can take advantage of the significant benefits provided by the hiring provisions of Article 
VUI( 1) of the Japanese FCN Treaty, Japanese companies may consider switching their U.S. enterprise 
from the subsidiary to the branch format. One of the m~or advantages to organization in the United 
States as a subsidiary is that liability for debts and judgments against the U.S. subsidiary will be limited to 
the assets of the subsidiary. H. HENN, LAw OF CoRPORATIONS § 73 (1970). However, this problem can be 
overcome if the Japanese company creates a single-purpose subsidiary in Japan. The Japanese sub-
sidiary would then establish a branch operation in the United States. Avagliano Court uaves Several Issues 
Unresolved, 5 LEGAL TIMES 17,22 (1982). For a discussion of the procedures required for organization 
and management of a branch, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF CoRPORATE, BANKING AND 
BUSINESS LAw, CoMMITTEE TO STUDY FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW (1979) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT]; 
J. FORRY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); Phillips, Legal 
Restraints on Foreign Direct Investment in the UniUd States, 7 COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, Appendix K ( 1976); Doing Business, I 
CORP. L. GUIDE (CCH), 1000 et seq. 
For a discussion of the U.S. tax consequences involved in organization as a branch or as a subsidiary 
see J. FORRY, supra; GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra; P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO 
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1981). 
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that for a company to be deemed a Japanese company, it must be incorporated in 
Japan. Thus, subsidiaries of Japanese corporations which are incorporated in 
the United States cannot invoke Article VIII( 1) while unincorporated branches 
of Japanese corporations operating in the United States do qualify as Japanese 
companies for treaty purposes. 
The circuits are split on the question of the extent of the rights granted by 
Article VIII( 1). The Fifth Circuit held that Article VIII(l) grants Japanese 
companies complete freedom in the area of hiring regardless of United States 
laws while the Second Circuit found that Article VIII( 1) could not be read even 
so broadly as to exempt Japanese companies from Title VII. An examination of 
the language and negotiating and legislative history of the treaty reveals that the 
intent of the signatories and of Congress was to allow Japanese companies 
freedom to hire their own citizens to fill certain executive functions in the United 
States. 
The Supreme Court has said that in certain situations discrimination based on 
citizenship does not constitute discrimination based on national origin in contra-
vention of Title VII. A Japanese employer hiring only Japanese citizens for its 
U.S. operation does not, however, fall into the type of situation for which this 
rule was promulgated by the Court. Since this type of discrimination has the 
effect of discrimination based on national origin, it is likely to be construed as a 
violation of Title VII. As a result, it appears that Article VIII( 1) grants com-
panies of Japan the right to hire based on national origin in contravention of 
Title VII. 
Resolution of the conflict between the Article VIII( 1) treaty provision and 
Title VII is likely to come down in favor of allowing both enactments to coexist. 
It has long been the policy of the Supreme Court to disfavor the repeal of a 
treaty or statute by implication and without express congressional action. Fur-
ther, where a specific statute, such as Article VIII( 1), is in conflict with a general 
statute, such as Title VII, the general statute has not been held to abrogate the 
specific one. Therefore, Article VIII( 1) must stand as an exception to Title VII. 
Judith A. Miller 
